

“The Other as the Enemy”: Political Discourse and Intolerance in Contemporary Brazil

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Abstract: In this study, we aim to evaluate the formation of the political discourse of the current Brazilian extreme right through four utterances produced by Federal Deputy Jair Bolsonaro (Social Liberal Party), namely: three posts on his profile page on the social network Facebook in 2015 and 2016, and his vote in the Chamber of Deputies in favor of the impeachment procedure against President Dilma Rousseff (Workers' Party), on April 16, 2016. In the first section, we discuss the historical organization of the extreme right's political discourse as of the June 2013 protests, evaluating the confluence between political, neoliberal, conservative Christian and military nationalist discourses. In the second section, we investigate the rhetorical strategies of the political discourse of parliamentarians through the interface between eristic refutations and intolerant discourses. In the third, we bring together the approaches of Lakoff & Johnson, Paveau and Cameron & Deignam to metaphor and the reinterpretation of Hall's ideology concept to suggest the theoretical-methodological category of distributed emergent metaphors. Finally, in the fourth section, we analyze the utterances produced by Deputy Bolsonaro. As a conclusion, we suggest that (i) the political discourse of the current Brazilian extreme right, which has Bolsonaro as its main representative, is based on the convergence between different conservative cultures in Brazil; (ii) the denial of the other in the discourse conveyed by the congressman constitutes the tension between the argumentative strategies of eristic refutations and the radical denial of the other produced by intolerance; and (iii) intolerant discourses are organized by the structural metaphor “the other is the enemy”.

Keywords: Political Discourse, Brazilian Far-Right, Argumentation, Discordant Interaction, Intolerant Discourse, Distributed Emergent Metaphors

1. Introduction

In this paper, we aim to understand the current symbolical identifications of far-right groups in Brazil, which have steadily grown in representation in the country's public debate in recent years. To achieve our aim, we investigate the interdiscursive, argumentative and metaphorical organization of one of these groups' main leaders, former Federal Deputy and current Brazilian President Jair Messias Bolsonaro (Social Liberal Party - PSL). As corpus, we used his discourse on the vote to institute the impeachment procedure against President Dilma Rousseff (Workers' Party - PT), and three texts found on his official Facebook page, all available to the public.

This paper is going to proceed through the following steps:

in the first section, we define what we understand as current far-right political groups in Brazil; in the second, we characterize Bolsonaro's discourse as an interface between a conflicting interaction, as defined by Emediato [5], and intolerant discourse, as Barros [1] proposes; in the third section, we write about the category of Distributed Emergent Metaphors, its assumptions defined by Morais [12]; in the final section we analyze the selected corpus.

2. June 2013 and the Brazilian Far-Right

According to Charaudeau [3], the political discourse encompasses everything related to life in society and public government. In this sense, the final objective of this discourse is the “sovereign good”, anchored in a kind of pact

that recognizes a "social ideal", constituted by the contradiction between the search for universal values and the respect for the variety of interests among the distinct groups in a society. Given that perspective, what are the characteristics of a political discourse defined by propositions that do not seek any form of consensus?

According to Arantes [19], the protests of June 2013 were responsible for the origin of what can be called the "New Right" in Brazil, defined by the author as an unconventional right, which does not follow the traditions of old politics and seeks to prevent any kind of change in Brazilian society's status quo. Ribeiro [31] argues that, while the dialogue between moderate right-wing and left-wing groups is possible, political extremism renders any attempt to build a public agenda futile. According to his perspective, what characterizes the current extreme right in Brazil is that it is more of a manifesto of social norms than a political agenda. The extreme right has distinguished itself from other groups by its fierce hate of human rights.

Löwy [10] points out that Brazil, differently from Europe, has no political parties built exclusively on racial ideas, so the most troublesome element of its conservative extreme right, with no direct equivalent in Europe, is the group's appeal to the Military. Despite that, there are currently two similarities between the realities: (i) repressive ideology, expressed by the cult of police brutality and institutionally represented in Brazil by the so-called "Bancada da Bala" (loosely translated as "Bullet Bloc"), which¹ encompasses many groups of representatives in different parliaments across the country; (ii) intolerance of any sexual minority, based on conservative Catholicism in France and growing Evangelicalism in Brazil².

According to Chauí [27], the expression of radical right-wing groups is associated with a little-noticed change among the more complex developments of the June 2013 protests, that is, the increased acceptance of ultraconservative agendas by the general public and the increase of their institutional representation in Brazilian politics. The researcher affirms that since 2015 it has been possible to more clearly notice growing claims for the return of the Military Dictatorship in Brazil, as well as the growing presence of ultraconservative groups such as *Tradição, Família e Propriedade* (Tradition, Family, and Property — TFP) and, in representative bodies,

the strengthening of the legislative bloc called "3B" ("Boi, Bala, Bíblia", loosely translated as "Bull, Bullet, Bible"), which is linked respectively to the demands of the landowning class, military institutions, and conservative Christians.

Regarding the relationship between the neoliberal project and religious thought in Brazil, Chauí [27] adds: One of the characteristics of neoliberalism is the way how it perceives the individual, not as part of a social class or as a being under development that will interact with the rest of society. The individual is neither conceived as an atom nor as a class, but rather as an investment. Evangelical (Neo-Pentecostal) churches have appropriated this idea and developed it into theology, the prosperity gospel, which considers each person precisely as an investment or company. There is, therefore, a phenomenon that strengthens both the neoliberal and conservative conceptions of the middle class via the way how evangelical churches have incorporated neoliberalism in their doctrine and created a whole new theology for that. If we combine the conservatism and reactionary tendencies of the urban middle class and the overwhelming presence of the evangelical churches, along with all the discussions about living conditions in rural areas (the land reform), we will understand why it is possible to effectively promote — through "bull, bullet, bible" groups — the conservative agenda currently observed. Thus, according to the author, the convergence between agendas of the "BBB Bloc"³ is explained, among other factors, by the reformulation of the conception of the individual along the lines of a neoliberal ideal, fitting them into the exclusionary social structures of Brazilian society, in a way that successfully encompasses the political, social, economic, and religious aspects.

The philosopher also argues that those structures are perpetuated through the structural violence that has historically been the main State tool to maintain public order. This relationship between structural violence and public order is founded upon ideals of hierarchy, verticality, conservatism, and authoritarianism, as well as upon the characterization of the elite's privileges as rights and of

1 According to Fagnello [6], the Bullet Bloc is the political representation of a set of ideas and attitudes based on the perception of increasing radical disorder and insecurity in society. In this sense, there is the ideation of police authority as a force with vast powers. The exaltation of warrior virtues and the heroism of policemen are combined with a securitarian-authoritarian discourse that sees violence as a pure and legitimate tool for solving social issues.

2 According to Villazón [17], Latin America has a longstanding tradition of evangelical presence, but that presence has rapidly risen in the last decades, especially in its Pentecostal segment. Such growth has strengthened its capacity to influence public ideas through evangelical political parties or, more frequently, through "pro-life" and "pro-family" associations. While at the beginning of the 20th century evangelical groups fought to enforce the separation between State and Church, in the present their stances against the so-called "gay agenda" and "gender ideology" have allied them with conservative Catholics against liberal transformations in family and society

3 The discourse of the extreme right is constituted by the confluence of distinct factors. Being only neoliberal, Christian, conservative, or in favor of the police would not necessarily place any individual or group in this political spectrum. There has to be, fundamentally, intolerance towards another. Also, the complex social formation of right-wing extremist groups in Brazil points toward a diversity of ideological spectres, although they seem to converge into some kind of discursive overdetermination — we see this aspect in detail in the third section of this paper. There are, for example, religious fundamentalist groups favorable to neoliberalism and opposed to any kind of drug policy reform, decriminalization of abortion, and legalization of same-sex relations, but not necessarily related to agendas like military intervention and the abolition of gun-control laws. Given that a significant part of Neo-Pentecostal evangelicals lives in the poorest and most dangerous parts of big cities, they are also potential victims of all kinds of urban violence, including violence committed by the police. There are also expressive groups in the middle class that are the most frequent victims of property crimes and are either civil servants or rely on state services to work. They are not aligned with the neoliberal ideal and the prosperity gospel but identify with the securitarian-authoritarian discourse (as defined by Fagnello [6]) and the idea of a military government. For a comparative analysis between the "Bullet" and "Bible" voters, see Fagnello [6].

marginalized groups' rights as "free-lunches". Violence, paradoxically, legitimates itself as an expression of order.

Using research by the Internet Management Committee of Brazil in 2012, which stated that 74% of the Brazilians connected to the internet used social media, with Facebook as the most popular, Silveira [16] asserts that it is no longer possible to analyze the construction of a space for public debate in Brazil without considering the role of internet spaces. According to him, if we compare it with the churches, schools, trade unions, associations, and political parties, Facebook stands out as the medium with the highest number of political debates and the one that involves the highest number of people.

The researcher also points out that, since the June 2013 protests, the New Right has performed better when it comes to the use of the new spaces available, organizing protests against the administration of Dilma Rousseff and also against agendas they consider "leftist"; as well as efficiently and significantly channeling the ideas and perspectives of different conservative groups towards a unified view and attitude on themes like sexual orientation, gender equality, criminal justice, education, family and other debates centered on moral values⁴.

In summary, we notice the symbolic (re)organization of the current right-wing extremist discourse as based on the convergence between distinct conservative traditions, such as (i) the conception of the individual as an investment and a company, (ii) private property as a sacred right, (iii) enrichment as the main indicator of liberty and individual, social and spiritual progress, (iv) the Christian family as the anchor of moral values, (v) rigid corporate/hierarchical structure as the basis for social organization, (vi) (re)engaging State and Religion in order to guarantee the political dominance of those already in power and (vii) the use of violence as a structural condition to maintain order and progress.

3. Between Disagreements and Intolerance: The Denial of Alterity as a Principle

Based on the studies of the "interview" and "political debate on television" genres, Emediato [5] analyses the characteristics of discourses constructed in regular enunciative situations, where disagreements between the participants happen without it leading to the rupture of the communicational contact. In these situations, there is no agreement between the interlocutors. Consequently, they are defined as "discordant interactions".

According to Emediato [5], discordant interactions are partially associated with Aristotelian dialectical refutations, which are subdivided into heuristic and eristic refutations. The formers manifest the effort by the agents to produce conclusions that are adequate to reality, having as an assumption the existence of common goals and attempting to transcend any egotistical sentiment — only focused on "winning" the argument — for the benefit of the alterity, that is, to see the other's propositions as legitimate. As an example, he points to the "academical debate".

Eristic refutations are, however, marked by the extreme antagonism between the agents of the communicative situation, to a point that individual interests are above any common objectives that may exist, like in an "electoral debate". Although there is no axiological validation between the antagonist discourses, participants maintain communicational contact, respect the interaction script and try to demonstrate cognitive effort and affection generally directed at a third party (tiers), that works as the real target of their arguments.

In a more advanced level of alterity, Barros [1] analyses the separatist discourse in Brazil based on what he calls "intolerant discourses", characterized first by the organization of the narrative as a sanction discourse; second by a passionate character, focused on hate and fear; and finally, by placing the diverse aspects of difference as a theme.

Those discourses are constituted at and by the crossing of distinct forms of intolerance — such as ethnic-racial, linguistic, religious, political, and socioeconomic — and are organized in a kind of "fundamental intolerance". According to Barros [1], intolerant discourse is, above all, a sanction discourse to individuals considered non-compliant to certain social norms (for example, being white and speaking the language in a certain standard), who should therefore be regarded with tags (such as ignorant blacks, illiterate, Indian, barbaric, Jews, free-riders or fanatical Arabs) and be punished (either with the loss of their civil rights, jobs or life). The sanction is manifested in a passionate manner, mobilizing the emotions of its interlocutors in favor of their group's affirmation and the denial of the other, the one who is the symbol of what is threatening, of the corruption and degeneration of values, of the parasite. For that, narratives are developed through themes of difference, solidly grounded on what separates them from the others whom they oppose.

To our research, the discursive positions of former Federal Deputy Jair Bolsonaro, as a member of the Brazilian National Congress, are in an unstable convergence between eristic refutation — disagreeing interaction — and intolerance, which differentiate themselves by the level of alterity denial, despite sharing this characteristic. As a politician, he is forced to follow rules when addressing his fellow Federal Deputies and the society, preserving the Parliamentary Decorum required by his position. However, when he takes positions against the respect of the alterity and of human dignity, he turns disagreements into intolerance, exceeding the limits of acceptable speech, both from a social and legal point of view.

4 In the extremist right-wing discourse, the conception of work itself is based on a moral perspective that divides the groups between "productive/efficient" and "unproductive/inefficient", being reinforced by ethics based on the neoliberal concepts of competition and individualism. From this perspective, the word "parasite" is frequently used as a metaphor for marginalized groups like the poor, people on welfare programs, women, blacks, northeasterners, and refugees. Regarding the neoliberal production of subjectivities, see Dardot and Laval [4].

4. Metaphor as a Cognitive-Discursive Phenomenon That Constitutes Language

As Lakoff and Johnson [9] state, metaphor is what organizes language into proper use. For the researchers, the corporal experiences of individuals enable the elaboration of linguistic-cognitive parameters that organize human language, such as structural metaphors — when a term X acquires the meaning of a term Y —, orientation metaphors — when special parameters to different concepts are established, associating "the most", "the biggest" and "at the top" to positive values, and "the least", "the smallest" and "at the bottom" to negative values —, and ontological metaphors, which allow the normalization of entities, emotions, and substances by referencing, grouping and quantifying them.

However, for Cameron and Deignan [2], the conceptual metaphor in Lakoff and Johnson [9] still seems to be bound to certain ahistorical cognitivism, prioritizing the universality of concepts to the detriment of the variation that occurs in different cultures and situational-interactional constructions. The "dialogical use and reuse" between subjects [2] allows conventions concerning the different aspects involved in the dynamic virtual formation of new metaphors, which associate ideational contents (expression of the concrete experience of the speakers through language), values, affections, grammatical forms, and pragmatics. In this view, the

metaphor would be a phenomenon of language that emerges as processual and intersubjective production, that evolves through the continuous local adaptations of linguistic (re)uses and acquires some stages of relative stability in a certain group.

Paveau [13] considers that the cognitive metaphorical structures function as internalized "pre-discourses" responsible for our capacity to attribute and comprehend meaning. In that case, metaphors work as organizers of the (pre)discourse in its most diverse instances, considering, for that, the integrated cognitive and discursive aspects (psychological organizer, through shared schemes; cognitive organizer, through knowledge and beliefs; discursive organizer, through cultures of a given time in a given community; and textual organizer, responsible for the procedures of sentence building and phrase linking).

Recently, in Moraes [12], we proposed an approximation between Lakoff's "conceptual metaphor", Cameron and Deignan's "emergent metaphor" [2], and Paveau's "pre-discourses" [13] when incorporating Hall's interpretations [7] of the Althusserian approach to ideology. According to Hall [7], the possibility of some meanings being above the others is contingent on history through a process he calls "double articulation between structure and practice", a way in which structures renew themselves, move forward, and consolidate. "We can say that structure is what previously structured practices have produced as a result. [...] Practice is how a structure is actively reproduced" [7].

Table 1. Characteristics of the "distributed emergent metaphors".

Social/Historical	They emerge by/in the modulation between the individual and society in a given discursive experience/practice that necessarily happens by the use of restrictive discursive systems that act as historical priority ties.
Indeterminate / Intangible / Irreducible	They do not exist as things per se, as essences that can be completely dominated and hermetically organized as distinctive systems throughout history, but as representable forms characterized as non-linear dynamical systems that are the product of the relation between social practices and structures.
Representable/ Internalizable	They are relatively easy to understand due to the lack of complexity and the simplicity of their linguistic-discursive forms in relation to other symbols in a group or social imaginary. They are determined by the historical exterior and work as a cognitive-discursive memory capable of consciously and/or unconsciously updating the "already-said" in the form of "now-said" emergent in a given discursive practice.
Semi-stable	They are subjugated to the countless variables of the cultural system whence they come. They work as semi-stable states, self-limited by the relation between paraphrase and polysemy. When altered, they trigger the reorganization of the competence of individuals.
Contradictory	They emerge as dominant structures divided by the constant internal movement which constitutes them, appearing as contingent singularities organized as "difference in complex unity" and as "unity in difference".
Discursively experienceable	They are sensed insofar as they work as discourse restriction systems and emerge in a given imagined discursive experience as reality itself. Experience does not function as a premise of discourse, it comes from the double articulation between structure and practice, in which discourses are indeterminate, albeit internalizable and representable, functioning as cognitive-discursive competencies in the form of historical apriorities that enable thinking/acting on/through language.
Intersubjective	Each discursive experience enables the emergence of a given position-subject in relation to the co-speaker, modulated according to the interaction between internalized discourse restriction systems (cognitive-discursive memory) and the historical event in a given condition of discursive production.
Real, symbolical, and imaginary (RSI)	They are real insofar as they are symbolical materialities produced in the concreteness of the historically contradictory human relations, which allow the emergence of imaginary formations. Their ideological nature derives from this relation, in which meanings emerge according to the practical relations established with the imaginary of social groups.
Distributed	They are externalized in different places of memory, with which they are in constant interrelation and interdependence in the ecology of human communication, such as the memory of/in the individuals, of/in the institutions and of/in the different human artifacts.
Typological	STRUCTURAL, due to the constitutive relation of the interpellation of the other, for example, when a term X acquires the meaning of a term Y; ONTOLOGICAL due to the attribution of a supposedly transcendent meaning to signs, which renders them discrete and described substances with human characteristics. In this case, they tend to be presented as metalanguage and link to the constituent discourses, emerging as products and disappearing as processes; ORIENTATION, due to the attribution of socially positive or negative axiology to signs, depending on their ties to the dominant/hegemonic meanings in a given society or group.

The formation of chains of enunciation, or connotative associations, as named by the Jamaican sociologist, is

responsible for the attribution of meaning to a given statement, given that it emerges as a discursive practice among other historical possibilities involved in a given enunciative situation. Therefore, structures would coexist as a complex system, in a way that the emergence of a semi-stable dominant meaning (unity in difference) would be historically limited by the social practices (distinctions within a unity) and neither fixed nor nullified by its previous position. Coming from the ideas of the authors cited above, Morais [12] systematizes the category of "distributed emergent metaphors", characterized as:

To make the analysis in this paper possible, we will use this category, which establishes a connection between the epistemology of Discourse Analysis [14, 13] and the cognitive studies of metaphor [9, 2]. Furthermore, basing ourselves on the approach suggested in Morais [12] for hate speech analysis, we have organized the analyzed texts in enunciative chains/connotative associations [7], which are marked by relations of semantic implication through the symbol "→", allowing the perception of the identity construction of the self and the other; we move on to evaluate the constitution of the distributed emergent metaphors through the argumentative formula "if X is Q, then Y is non-Q", where X = non-Y.

Finally, in the next section, we examine 4 texts published between the years 2015 and 2016 by Federal Deputy Jair Bolsonaro on his official Facebook page, which make up a corpus under construction about the current political discourse of the extreme right in Brazil. Besides posts of the Bolsonaro family on Facebook and Twitter, we have been collecting interviews and newspaper stories that explicitly show his political positions throughout his political career.

5. For God, Country, and Family: The "Good Citizen" as a Political Player in Brazil

Intolerance has ravaged many societies in the contemporary world. In Europe, for example, far-right parties had significant electoral gains in the 2017 parliamentary elections, as pointed out by the BBC [20, 21]: In Germany, the Alternative for Germany Party (AfD) had 12,6% of the votes; in Austria, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) had 26% as part of a coalition government; in Denmark, the Danish People's Party (DF) had 21%; in Finland, The Finns Party (PS) had 18%; in France, National Rally (RN) had 13%, plus the fact that Marine Le Pen, the main representative of the French extreme right, had 34,1% of the votes in the 2017 presidential elections; in The Netherlands, the Party for Freedom (PVV) had 13%; in Hungary, Jobbik had 19%; in Italy, The League (LN) had 17,4%; in the Czech Republic, the Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) had 11%; in Sweden, the Sweden Democrats (SD) had 17,6%; and in Switzerland, the Swiss People's Party (SVP) had 29%.

In the United States of America, Donald Trump was nominated by the Republican Party and elected president

with 59.937.338 votes, winning in 29 states and having 290 votes in the Electoral College. In Brazil, the biggest country in Latin America, Jair Messias Bolsonaro (PSL)⁵ was elected president on October 27, 2018, with approximately 57,8 million votes (55,13% of the votes cast, equivalent to 39,3% of all registered voters in the country). During his campaign, Bolsonaro defended, among other things, the past Brazilian Military Dictatorship (1964-1985) and the torture and persecution of minorities, left-wingers, and social movements, in clear opposition to human rights.

According to a survey by Datafolha on October 02, 2018 [29], Bolsonaro voters were composed of 55% of men and 45% of women; 15% were aged 16 to 24 years old, 24% were between 25 and 34 years old, 20% between 35 and 44 years old, 22% between 45 and 59 years old and 18% were older than 60; 22% had completed only primary education, 47% had finished secondary school and 32% had a university degree; 28% earned up to twice the minimum wage, 43% earned between 2 to 5 times the minimum wage, 19% earned 5 to 10 times and 8% had monthly earnings 10 times higher than the minimum wage (3% refused to answer or could not inform it); 48% lived in the Southeast region, 20% in the South region, 16% in the Northeast region, 8% in the Mid-West and 7% in the North region. In the Datafolha survey of October 10, 2018 [26], the candidate had 59% of the votes of the self-identified white part of the electorate, 47% of the votes of "pardos" (multiracial or "brown" people), and 37% of the votes of black people (in this group, his main opponent, Fernando Haddad (PT), had 45%).

Alves [18] used the samples of an October 25 Datafolha survey to estimate that Bolsonaro won the votes of 29.795.232 Catholics, 21.595.284 Evangelicals (a group where his victory margin was the largest, by 11.552.780 votes), 312.975 followers of Afro-Brazilian religions, 1.721.363 Kardecists, 709.410 followers of other religions, 3.286.239 voters who did not inform their religion and 375.570 atheists and agnostics, in a total of 57.796.074 votes. It is important to point out that Fernando Haddad won the majority of votes in three religious groups: followers of Afro-Brazilian religions (755.887 votes), voters who did not inform a religion (4.157.381 votes), and atheists and agnostics (691.097 votes).

This data allows us to analyze the characteristics of Bolsonaro voters — his audience — the third party to whom he directs his speech as a speaker. Among the mentioned information, it is of interest to see the good acceptance of right-wing extremist discourse among the group that is white, male, Catholic or Evangelical, Southeastern, aged between

5 President Jair Bolsonaro has been associated with several political parties throughout his political life: 1988-1993, Democratic Christian Party; 1993-1995, Reformist Progressive Party; 1995-2003, Progressist Brazilian Party; 2003-2005, Brazilian Labor Party; 2005, Party of the Liberal Front; 2005-2016 Progressive Party; 2016-2018, Social Christian Party. In 2018 he joined the Social Liberal Party and was elected President. This "mobility" shows, on one side, the fragility of his political project, and on the other, the weakening of the political party system and the consequent tendency of personification of politics.

25 to 59, with secondary education or higher, and income between 2 and 5 times the minimum wage.

Besides that, the usual supporter of Jair Bolsonaro is actively engaged in social media, as demonstrated by the 8 million followers on his official Facebook page near the 2018 election, given the fact that he started his campaign with 5,5 million voters on August 31 [28]. As a comparison, on February 16, 2019, this number was 10.584.214 followers. Let us see, then, one of his posts, made on July 18, 2015:

On Wednesday, in an event for its honoring, I saluted the newspaper "O GLOBO" for its 90 years. I recommended, from the Tribune, the reading of the editorial - JUDGEMENT OF THE REVOLUTION - of October 7, 1984, signed by ROBERTO MARINHO: "We participated in the Revolution of 1964, IDENTIFIED WITH THE NATIONAL WISH of PRESERVATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, threatened by the IDEOLOGICAL RADICALIZATION, STRIKES, SOCIAL DISORDER and GENERALIZED CORRUPTION...". The political climate today (with thousands of Cuban agents...) is worse than the one before April 02, 1964, when the National Congress REMOVED João Goulart from office. PT is preparing to NOT LEAVE THE POWER regardless of the DEMOCRATIC means... The disarming of good citizens, the class struggle, the destruction of family values... those are only some of the faces of the Brazilian left seeking its perpetuation in power [22].

In his speech, he builds a narrative composed of two antagonistic sides: On one side, the good citizens, on the other, the Brazilian left and the Workers' Party (PT). In a logical sense, the good citizens would be opposed by the non-good citizens. It can be inferred that the good citizen is not only a non-leftist/"petista", but that they also repudiate everything associated with them, rendering the two groups mutually excluding. The conflicting position between the two groups would be justified on the grounds that the Brazilian Left would be characterized as anti-nationalist, anti-democratic, ideologically radical, dotted with revolted workers on strike, corrupt and communist; therefore, in favor of disarming the good citizens, of the class struggle and of the denial of family values. In citing the editorial of the old owner of the "O Globo" newspaper, Roberto Marinho, the Federal Deputy proposes a resignification of the Military Dictatorship (1964-1985) as a "Revolution", since, in a supposed reaction to a supposed threat from leftist terrorists, the taking of power by the military was a necessary measure to guarantee the order, the democratic institutions and the will of the people.

For the congressman, similarly to what occurred in 1964, we currently faced the danger of the rupture of the political, economic and social status quo, because both the institutions and the citizens would be threatened by the domination of the so-called leftist agenda. Following this argumentative strategy, the undesired other is actually the guilty part of the violence it suffers, because it is paradoxically established that the violent repression and the military regime or state of

exception are legitimate means to maintain democracy, and violence is justified as a means to maintain respect for the alterity, dialogue and plurality.

Having said that, we can build the subsequent chain of utterances: (I) good population → good citizens → nationalist → democratic → capitalist → right to work → in favor of law and order → honest → pro-guns → in favor of the harmony between social groups → pro-family → excluded from the representative instances of power. In contrast, the "leftist" is defined as (II) non-good population → non-good citizen → not nationalist → undemocratic → communist → pro-unions and strikes → riotous → corrupt → pro-gun control → favoring class struggle → against family values → having power → dominating the representative instances.

That argumentative organization is based on axiology that legitimates and puts the first group in a positive perspective, the I/We constituted by their institutional peers, voters and supporters, denies and puts the second one, the "leftists", the other, in a negative perspective, regardless of whether they hold political representation. Approximately four months after that, on November 14, 2015, the congressman posted the message below on Twitter and Facebook:

P/Face – Today The arrival of foreigners, without any control, allows the infiltrators (scum) to bring terror straight to those who welcome them. Dilma Rousseff announced at the UN that Brazil will receive North African refugees with open arms. Will we be free of terrorism, since PT refuses to have a law against terrorism? After France, will some still call me a "xenophobe" or right-wing extremist? [23].

The phrase "P/Face - today" reveals the importance of this social media as a facilitating tool for dialogue with his supporters. In that way, a communicational contract is created, anchored in a tacit understanding among common interests in this virtual community, in which the presidential candidate puts forward his political positions, without intermediaries, and his followers can both follow his actions and interact with him about a given subject as if a direct dialogue between voter and representative existed. Therefore, there is an effect of intimacy between the politician and his potential voters, a dynamic identification zone between the parts, in an institutional sense, as the federal deputy represented a legislative house and had formal obligations, and in a personal sense, as following his routine represented a way of trespassing the ritualistic aspects and allowed the feeling of an amicable and intimate relationship. The emotional bonds and the persuasive capacity of the speaker in relation to his public are, therefore, strengthened, and a more empirical — real — imaginary projection of one another is guaranteed.

Concerning the connotative chains between the given signs, the semantic opposition seems to be renewed in relation to the anterior message through the positioning of the welcoming people (= good citizens) on one side and of Dilma Rousseff, the PT and the infiltrators (= non-good citizens) on the other. In the wake of this tight/radical separation,

essentialized between the two groups, the congressman stokes fear in the Brazilian population regarding the opening of their borders to the refugees, going back to a national security problem that is presumed by the lack of antiterrorist legislation in the country to create specific legal tools against those who threaten the State. The partial association between foreigners, infiltrators and "the scum", and between Dilma Rousseff, PT and their alleged opposition to the Anti-Terrorism Law allegedly justified the accusations that some of the refugees might be terrorists and that the President was irresponsible, unable to decide on the subject and permissive⁶ with the "scum", both groups being targets of hatred and denial.

As an argumentative strategy, an I/we is formed which aims to distance itself from the accusations of right-wing extremism and xenophobia, trying to legitimize its proposals in the current national political spectrum. The author then recognizes that his institutional role is to try to avoid the instigation of intolerance, that is, the fact that his denial of the other has to follow some rules of political conduct, which are anchored at a democratic and republican "social ideal", thus avoiding any accusations of fomenting disrespect to universal values and plurality, which would break the tacit agreement of the eristic refutation. For this purpose, the following connotative association can be seen: (III) good citizens → welcoming → threatened by terrorism; opposed to (IV) non-good citizens → admitting refugees/foreigners → allowing infiltrators/scum → permissiveness/incompetence of Dilma Rousseff and PT.

On April 17, 2016, in the session that would appreciate the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff (PT), in the Chamber of Deputies, the Federal Deputy cast his vote with this discourse:

On this day of glory for the Brazilian people, there is a name that will go down in history today, because of how he conducted the works in this house. Congratulations, speaker Eduardo Cunha. They lost in 1964, and now they lost in 2016. For the family and the innocence of children at school, which PT never had, against communism, for our liberty, against the São Paulo Forum, in memory of Colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra, the terror of Dilma Rousseff, for the Army of Caxias, for our Armed Forces, for a Brazil above everything and for God above all, my vote is yes [24].

This speech synthesizes a group of relevant ideological positions for the construction of the ultraconservative political discourse, such as: the economic thought of the discourse, manifested by the (neo)liberal sign "liberty" and by the phrases "against communism", "against the São Paulo Forum" — an organization considered communist; the conservative Christian discourse, manifested by phrases like

"for the family", "for the innocence of children at school" — a reference to the proposal of a "School without Homophobia Kit" by the Ministry of Education — and "God above all"; and for the military securitarian/authoritarian discourse, manifested by phrases such as "in memory of Colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra" — a man recognized, even in legal stances, as the "main torturer of the Brazilian military dictatorship", with Dilma Rousseff among his victims —, "for the army of Caxias" — the Duke of Caxias is recognized as the "Father of the Brazilian Army" —, "for our Armed Forces" and "Brazil above everything"⁷⁸.

In the phrase "They lost in 1964, and now they lost in 2016", there is yet another attempt to revisit the Brazilian historical memory because it refers to the 1964 Coup to define the I/We as "winners" and the other/enemy as "loser" in the situation described in the phrase. In those two situations, what was in question was the maintenance of the order in Brazilian society against the communists, regarded by ultraconservatives as "infiltrators/scum" in Brazil, as people that seek to destroy the fundamental values of the State such as the Christian God, the traditional family, the idea of nation and private property. Thus, we have the subsequent enunciation chain: (V) good citizen → in favor of the 1964 Revolution → pro-family → pro-liberty → in defense of the innocence of the children → supporting the "Army of Caxias" and our Armed Forces, in general, → with Brazil above everything → with God above everyone. Directly opposing the good citizen there is the: (VI) non-good citizen → in favor of PT → in favor/member of the São Paulo Forum → pro-communism.

In this discourse, there is an attempt to establish a discordant interaction between him and his political opponents, since he tries to follow the rules of parliamentary

6 It is important to remember that Dilma Rousseff fought against the Military Dictatorship in Brazil (1964-1985) by joining the National Liberation Command (Comando de Libertação Nacional - COLINA) and the Armed Revolutionary Vanguard Palmares (Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares - VAR PALMARES), and was arrested and tortured in Juiz de Fora, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro [30]. She is, therefore, considered a former terrorist by the supporters of the military dictatorship period in Brazil.

7 Concerning the relation between the various right-wing groups and the neoliberal discourse in Brazil, Kaysel [8] points out that before the democratic transition the support for the Military Dictatorship was the main aspect of what formed the ideological alignment with the right, while during the democratization process, especially during the drafting of the new constitution (1987-1988), the right welcomed the defense of economic liberalization policies, defined as neoliberal, as its main aspect. This new orientation was further affirmed during the next decade, through the creation of different neoliberal think tanks, supported by American think tanks, the Liberal Institute of Rio de Janeiro as the first one in 1983. Since it is not the scope of this article to discuss the continuities and discontinuities of the liberal and neoliberal discourses in the Brazilian extreme right, we only highlight that it is possible to observe a change in presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro during his campaign, from liberal to neoliberal, mainly because of an attempt to court the business and banking sector associated with his campaign. That allows us to show the historicity of the analyzed discourse, which has to be understood as "internally contradictory" (difference in complex unity), although it assumes a global coherence (unity in difference), and is limited by the historical process. Understanding that there are contradictions and overdetermination in the discourse of the Brazilian extreme right, as discussed in note number 4, we use the prefix "neo" in parenthesis. For a deeper discussion about the discontinuity between the classical liberal and the neoliberal discourse, we recommend Dardot and Laval [4]. It must also be noted that while neoliberalism seems to be a fundamental characteristic of the far-right political discourse, for Rancière [15], the constant destruction of the political space in Europe by the neoliberal model after the 1960s and the growing failure of State representative and justice systems in curbing financial and corporative power are the two main causes for the rise of far-right and nationalist groups in the continent.

8 See note 2.

procedure, but does not show any inclination to dialogue, negotiation, or consensus. His voters, the main target of his speech, are materialized as a third party, absent from the session in the Chamber. However, when he salutes the military dictatorship and especially when he pays tribute to the memory of one of its main torturers, the discourse of the congressman breaks the democratic conventions and takes the form of intolerance.

That demonstrates the instability of the confluence between eristic refutation — when the denial of alterity maintains a given communicational contract — and the intolerant discourse — when there is the presentation of physical and moral sanctions to the group considered the enemy in the argumentative organization of the discourse of the Brazilian extreme right. When such discourse defines itself as a political position, it seeks to legitimate itself, and its defense rests on the grounds of the right to free speech, as well as in distancing itself from the accusation of hate speech. For that, normally, extremists paint themselves as the real "excluded", "threatened", "persecuted" and "intimidated" ones, strategically altering their position of "authoritarian/oppressors/aggressors" to the position of "democrats/oppressed/victims", a situation that creates empathy with their target audience through the emotions of fear and hate and authorizes exceptional measures.

Both in the virtual and institutional spaces, these strategies can originate reactions that range from radical support to the right to speak one's mind — allegedly an "expression of the truth" — to repulse toward those who prioritize respect for dialogue, alterity and diversity. The rupture of the rules of eristic refutation in favor of intolerant discourse in this speech becomes clear when, a week later, on April 24, left-wing student groups in favor of democracy and human rights protested in front of the house of the congressman. About that, Jair Bolsonaro writes:

Globonews asked to comment on what happened today: 'I was home this morning when about 100 idle people with red flags closed the access to my condominium. In face of so many threats, I gave them this message: 1 - If you trespass, you will not leave; 2 - My private property is sacred; 3 - My wife and my 13- and 5-year-old daughters will never be taken hostage by you; 4 - That's why PT disarmed the Brazilian people.' Jair Bolsonaro, Captain - RJ - Artillery - Federal Deputy - PSC - RJ [25].

Some questions are relevant for the interpretation of the text: first, posting a declaration on his own social media profile guarantees a more direct relation with his audience; second, defining protesters as "idle" and "with red flags" places them in the group of those who do not value work as a form of insertion in society, paraphrasing, through common sense, the opposition between the economic (neo)liberal discourse and the communist discourse; third, using military terms to describe his image and the event — "threaten to trespass" and "take hostage", and signing the message as "Artillery Captain" can create a scenario akin to a battle or situation of extraordinary disorder and legitimize the use of symbolical and physical force as a form of retaliation, since it

would be the "defenders" against the "enemies"; fourth, defining private property as a fundamental right sacred to public order points to an interface between the neoliberal and the religious discourse; fifth, presenting the particular condition of his family as a threatened group in metonymical relation with that of the Brazilian family serves to justify the need for the right of all citizens to bear arms, bringing together the Christian conservative and the securitarian/authoritarian military discourse; sixth, opposing PT — directly associated with "idle people", "red flags", "trespassers" — and "good citizens" again establishes metonymical relations between the situation experienced by the Deputy and that of the country as a whole — the description of this particular experience could promote empathy and the identification of similar experiences as an analogy; seventh, and last, signing as "Federal Deputy - PSC - RJ" legitimizes his speech in the institutional political discourse⁹.

Thus, his speech is about a man who, besides being a former military man and a representative at the national congress, is like any Brazilian citizen and has the right to defend himself, his family and property, and may, if necessary, eliminate those who threaten him. The subsequent chain is, therefore, constructed: (VII) good citizen → threatened → defender of private property → defender of family → defender of the right to bear arms → defender of the Brazilian people; against (VIII) non-good citizen → idle people → with red flags → trespassers → PT. If we sum up all the connotative associations that have been presented here, we find the subsequent semantic relations for the discourse of the political extreme right today:

1st) Good population → good citizen → (extreme) right-wing politics → nationalist/patriotic/using national colors → democratic → capitalist → (neo)liberal → working/orderly/moral/honest/competent → excluded from/threatened by representative instances → threatened by terror/internal and external invasion → pro-guns → in favor of paternalist/corporate/hierarchical harmony between social groups → in favor of the Christian family → pro-military → defending market freedom/private property/the individual → defender of the Brazilian people/country;

Opposed to:

2nd) Non-good population → non-good citizen → political left/PT → non-nationalist/unpatriotic/user of red flags →

9 About the metonym category, Lakoff and Johnson [9] deal, specifically, with synecdoche, defined as the process through which humans can grasp the whole by its parts, such as the producer for the product; the object utilized for the user; the person in charge for the executor; the institution for the people in charge; the place for the institution; and, finally, the place for the event. Similarly, to Pêcheux [14], this event demonstrates the discursive functioning of the relation of the part with the whole, of the symptom with the cause, etc. For the analyst, this occurs because of the functioning of the "transverse-discourse" (interdiscursive organization) in relation to the intradiscursive articulation of the text, the former being the means by which discourses refer to their exterior to articulate in the form of the latter, that is, by linearization. Regarding the attempts to bring together Experiential Realism and Pêcheux's view on Discourse Analysis, see Paveau [13] and Moraes [11].

anti-democracy → communist → idle/on strike/rioting/immoral/corrupt/incompetent → power-hungry → terrorist/infiltrator/the scum → in favor of disarming the population → in favor of class struggle → wanting to destroy Christian family values → against the military/the military regime → against free market/the individual → threatening the Brazilian people/the country.

Given the argumentative formula "if X is Q, then Y is non-Q" [12], we have that if the good citizen is heterosexual, (neo)liberal, militarist, patriotic and Christian, the non-good citizen is non-heterosexual, non-neoliberal, non-militarist, non-patriotic, non-Christian. The concept of the good citizen — ontological metaphor — acquires positivity — orientation metaphor — by its symbolical association to the dominant groups in Brazilian society, organized by the metaphor that the other is the enemy — structural metaphor.

The certainty of being on the "good" side, as a transcendental notion of what is good, correct and right, implies, by default, the denial of the alterity, passionately characterized as "evil". In the political discourse of the extreme right, the political intolerance towards the other (non-being) organizes the fundamental disagreement with other groups (ethnic-racial, linguistic, aesthetic, religious, socioeconomic, etc.). In addition, as we have observed, this discourse emerges in the tension between the disagreeing interaction — eristic refutation — and the intolerant discourse by means of the interface between the political discourse — basis of the institutional legitimacy of speeches —, the conservative Christian discourse — basis of the values of purity and tradition —, the military nationalist discourse — basis of the conceptions of order, hierarchy and authority —, and the neoliberal economic discourse — basis of the ideas of individual, liberty and private property.

6. Final Considerations

This paper is a modest attempt to contribute to the understanding of the current socio-political organization, especially the discursive organization of the extreme right in Brazil. For that, we rely on the works of Barros [1], which concern the characteristics of intolerant discourses and identities, Emediato [5], regarding the definition of discordant interactions, and Moraes [12], on the potential of the theoretical and methodological uses of the Distributed Emergent Metaphors and of argumentative formulas for the analysis of hate speeches.

In short, using a discursive-cognitive approach to human language, considering, therefore, the social-historical aspects that affect the imaginary organization of symbolic structures, we observe how the discursive metaphor of the Brazilian Military Dictatorship has gone through a positive resignifying process in the current political context in order to characterize the good citizens (ontological metaphors) as superior political players (orientation metaphor) in comparison to their enemies (structural metaphor): the political left, the excluded, social movements or any group that seeks to change the historically inherited status quo of

economic and power relations in Brazilian contemporary society. As an argumentative strategy, those groups position themselves as the real "oppressed" and "persecuted" people, relying on a semantical chain that interdiscursively brings together conservative Christian, nationalist, military and neoliberal political discourses.

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